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THE TENSION BETWEEN LEGAL
INSTRUMENTALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Brian Z. Tamanaha*
At the heart of the United States legal culture lie two core notions
that exist in deep tension with one another: the idea that law is an
instrument, and the rule of law ideal. Although they continue to coexist
despite this tension, there are indications that the instrumental view of
law is putting a serious strain on the rule of law ideal. In addition to the
fact that both notions are equally fundamental in our legal culture, what
makes this situation especially intransigent is that there is little attention
to the debilitating effects that legal instrumentalism has on the rule of
law. This internal tension is especially important to understand in
connection with the prospects for establishing the rule of law around the
world because both ideas are being promoting abroad simultaneously,
as a package.
It will help the argument to state up front what is meant by legal
instrumentalism and what is meant by the rule of law. Both ideas are
plagued by a surplus of alternative understandings and variations, so
here they will be stated in plain and simplified terms, to be elaborated
upon later. Broadly speaking, the instrumental view of law is the notion
that law is an instrument to achieve ends. At the systemic level, it has
often been said that law is an instrument to serve the public good, or an
instrument to direct social change; it has also often been said that law is
an instrument of domination by one group over another within society.
In this understanding the law is an empty vessel that can be filled in any
way desired, at the will of the lawmaker, to achieve any end desired. At
the level of legal practice, it has been said that lawyers instrumentally
manipulate or utilize legal rules and processes to achieve the ends of
their clients; in relation to judging it has been said that judges
increasingly reason instrumentally to lead to particular outcomes when
deciding cases.
Although there are many competing formulations of the rule of law
ideal, they can be lumped into two basic versions. 1 The substantive
version of the rule of law is the idea that there are legal limits on the
government: there are certain things the government cannot do, even
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when exercising its sovereign lawmaking power. This version of the
rule of law ensures the "rightness" of law in accordance with a
preexisting higher standard. The formal version of the rule of law is the
idea that the government is bound to abide by legal rules that are
publicly set forth in advance, are certain and stable, and are applied
equally to all in accordance with their terms. This version of the rule of
law ensures the predictability of law, which allows citizens to plan their
affairs with knowledge of the legal consequences of their actions. Both
versions of the rule of law ideally share the basic proposition that the
government and its officials, as well as citizens, operate within legal
limits and are bound to follow legal rules. The basic difference is that
the former version sets limits on the permissible content of law, whereas
in the latter version the law can be whatever the law maker desires, as
long as it satisfies the formal requirements set out above. Legal theorist
Joseph Raz emphasized the key implication of this difference: "A nondemocratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on
extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and racial
persecution, may in principle, conform to the requirements of the
[formal] rule of law .... " 2 Substantive versions of the rule of law, by
contrast, would rule out evil laws as invalid.
Using these general descriptions, the two types of tension between
legal instrumentalism and the rule of law ideal can now be summarily
stated. At the systemic level the tension arises because the idea that law
is an instrument is, in itself, devoid of any limits on the content of law.
The only constraints on law are social ones, relating to the efficacy of
the law and its ability to overcome any resistance it may face in pursuit
of the ends designated. The purely instrumental view of law, to state it
more pointedly, directly challenges the notion that there are substantive
limits on law. Law is there to serve ends designated by the lawmaker,
whatever those ends might be and whatever the means required to
achieve those ends.
Indeed, it is important to recognize, the modem shift in liberal
societies away from a substantive understanding of the rule of law
toward a formal understanding of the rule of law was concomitant with
the rise of the instrumental view-they were linked as siblings born of
the same complex of factors. This ·association is plainly evident in
Raz's avowedly instrumental characterization of law in a formal rule of
law system:

2. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 211 (1979).
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A good knife is, among other things, a sharp knife. Similarly,
conformity to the [formal] rule of law is an inherent value of laws,
indeed it is their most important inherent value. . . . Like other
instruments, the law has a specific virtue which is morally neutral in
being neutral as to the end to which the instrument is put. 3

A purely instrumental view of law, however, in addition to
challenging the substantive rule of law, also has a tendency to undercut
the formal rule of law. In relation to the conduct of lawyers and judges,
an instrumental understanding of law suggests that legal rules and
processes are tools to be manipulated to achieve desired objectives,
rather than as binding dictates. Lawyers stretch and twist legal rules
that stand in their way; judges reason toward ends or goals, setting aside
or creatively interpreting legal rules if need be. In both situations an
instrumental view of law detracts from the essential characteristic that
defines rules: their binding quality. Legal instrumentalism at this level
operates against the formal rule of law requirements that the legal rules
be certain and stable, and be applied equally to all according to their
terms.
Starting with a discussion of former non-instrumental views of
law, I will support these assertions by outlining the growth and
implications of instrumental views of law for the rule of law in the
respects just indicated.

I.

NON-INSTRUMENTAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF LAW

It is characteristic of non-instrumental views that the content of
law is in some sense given; that law is immanent; that the process of
law-making is not a matter of creation but one of discovery; that law is
not the product of human will; that law has a kind of autonomy and
internal integrity; that law is in some sense objectively determined.
In the Medieval period in Europe two distinct (yet commingled)
types of law possessed these characteristics. The first type was natural
law and divine law in the Catholic tradition-the Ten Commandments,
for example. Divine and natural Law were thought to be binding upon
and infused the positive law that governed society. They were pregiven by God and were the product of God's will, unalterable by man.
They were objective in that they constituted absolute moral and legal
truths that were binding on all. They set limits on the positive law. The
content of these laws and principles were discerned through revelation

3. Id. at 225-26 (emphasis added).
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(including scripture) and through the application of reason implanted in
man by God. As medieval scholar Walter Ullmann put it, "the law itself
as the external regulator of society was based upon faith. Faith and law
stood to each other in the relation of cause and effect. ,,4
The second type was customary law. Everyday life during the
Medieval period was governed by customary law, or, more accurately,
by overlapping and sometimes conflicting regimes of customary law:
feudal law, the law of the manor, Germanic customary law, residues of
Roman law, trade customs, and local customs. Customary law was said
to have existed from time immemorial. It was derived from and
constituted the very way of life of the community, the byways and
folkways of the people. Law was "'the law of one's fathers', the
preexisting, objective, legal situation. . . . " 5 As such, the content of
customary law was not the product of any particular individual or any
group's will, but was a collective emanation from below. Accordingly,
the process of explicitly articulating and applying the law was a matter
of discovering and declaring the unwritten law that was already
manifested or immanent in the community life.
These intertwined understandings of law, which dominated for at
least a millennium, were non-instrumental in the core respect that they
represented a pre-given order that encompassed everyone, including
state officials and the sovereign. It was a law for all that was the
product of no one. The law was not subject to the will of anyone and
not in the specific interest of anyone. It was the law of the community.
Certain groups were in more favorable positions than others, to be sure,
as nobles were to serfs, but everyone had a place within an organic
society governed by law. Legislation in the modem sense of the
enactment of positive legal norms did exist, but it was sparse and
generally understood to involve making explicit the already existing
immanent law. Emperors, kings and princes had the power to declare
law, but this power was bounded by the natural, divine, and customary
law. Acts of express law-making always took place within a framework
of already existing, non-will based law.
Historical understandings of the common law in the United States
provide two distinct examples of non-instrumental law. The first one,
which held sway through the second half of the nineteenth century, is
continuous with the above two Medieval understandings of law; the
second one, which grew in the course of the nineteenth century and
4.
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dominated for a short time into the twentieth century, characterized law
as a science.
The common law in the U.S. was heavily influenced by English
common law, although it came to follow a separate path. Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England had an inestimable impact,
providing the basic training material for apprentices who wished to
become lawyers in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well
the leading text in early law schools. 6 The U.S. legal tradition was also
influenced by a strong belief in the natural rights of life, liberty, and
property, as indicated in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of
Rights.
Traditional English understandings of the common law, carried
over to the U.S., pointed to two underpinnings. 7 First, as with the
Medieval views described above, the common law was thought to be a
product of the customs of the people from time immemorial, an "ancient
collection of unwritten maxims and customs," Blackstone wrote. 8 It
was said that the law represented the lived ways of the community, their
collective wisdom recognized and refined into law-"the expression or
manifestation of commonly shared values and conceptions of
reasonableness and the common good." 9 This origin in the customs and
usages of the people was thought to render the law consensual in nature.
"This consent is deeper than agreeing to have other persons represent
one in a legislative assembly. It comes from a recognition that the rules
that governs one's life are one's own, they define that life, give it
structure and meaning, are already practiced and so deeply engrained
that they appear to one as purely natural." 10 At the same time, the
common law was also the very embodiment of reason, natural rights
and principle. This was so because universal custom and usage was
thought to reflect and be evidence of natural principle, and also because
judges refined the common law and its principles through reasoned
analysis. When engaging in this activity judges were declaring law, not
creating law.

6. See Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A
Study of Intellectuallmpact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1976).
7. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF LAW: AN ESSAY ON
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (2d ed. 1996) (discussing Blackstone's Commentaries with
superb incite).
8. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 17 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1767), quoted in GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 4 (1986).
9. POSTEMA, supra note 8, at 6-7.
10. Id. at 16-17.
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Jesse Root, a leading U.S. lawyer, articulated in 1798 this
characteristic understanding:
[Our] common law was derived from the law of nature and of
revelation; those rules and maxims of immutable truth and justice,
which arise from the eternal fitness of things, which need only to be
understood, to be submitted to; as they are themselves the highest
authority; together with certain customs and usages, which had been
universally assented to and adopted in practice, as reasonable and
beneficial. 11

According to Root, the common law: "is the perfection of reason";
"universal"; "embraces all cases and questions that can possibly arise";
"is in itself perfect, clear and certain"; "is superior to all other laws and
regulations"; "all positive laws are to be construed by it, and wherein
they are opposed to it they are void"; "it is immemorial." 12 There is a
remarkable continuity to these views of the common law within the
Anglo-American legal tradition that extends back centuries. 13
By the early nineteenth century, these longstanding ideas about law
had begun to lose their power, owing in part to Enlightenment ideas and
owing in part to new social and economic realities that rendered the old
common law rules obsolete. Borrowing from the newfound prestige of
the natural sciences, science was the ascendant form of legitimation for
law. Blackstone, whose Commentaries were based on a series of
lectures he delivered at Oxford commencing in 1753, claimed that "law
is to be considered not only as a matter of practice, but also as a rational
science"; 14 as such, it was "an object of academical knowledge" that
ought to be studied in the University. 15 The extraordinary success of the
Commentaries owed in large part to its organized categorization and
systematic presentation of the common law, a feat not previously
accomplished.
As the prestige of science grew, so did the identification of the
common law as a science. Richard Rush, a leading U.S. lawyer,
11. JESSE ROOT, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT AND LAWS IN CONNECTICUT,

Preface to Volume /, iv (1798), excerpted in MARK

DEWOLFE, READINGS IN AMERICAN

LEGAL HISTORY 17, 16-24 (1949).

12. DE WOLFE, supra note 11, at 19.
13. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 32-33 ( 1957).
14. BOORSTIN, supra note 7, at 20.
15. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 32 (1989).
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published an essay in 1815 on "American Jurisprudence," which
declared: "The law itself in this country, is, moreover, a science of great
extent. We have an entire substratum of common law as the broad
foundation upon which every thing else is built." 16 An unattributed
1851 essay in a major law journal described the sense in which law is a
science:
Like other sciences, [law] is supposed to be pervaded by general rules,
shaping its structure, solving its intricacies, explaining its apparent
contradictions. Like other sciences, it is supposed to have first or
fundamental principles, never modified, and the immovable basis on
which the whole structure reposes; and also a series of dependent
principles and rules, modified and subordinated by reason and
circumstances, extending outward in unbroken connection to the
remotest applications oflaw. 17

Among the legal elite this was a standard understanding. Nationally
renowned law reformer, David Dudley Field, in 1859 effused that there
is no science "greater in magnitude or importance" than "the science of
law." 18
Christopher Columbus Langdell, appointed in 1870 to be the first
Dean of the Harvard Law School, offered an often cited articulation:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines .... Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by
slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a
series of cases. . . . It seems to me, therefore, to be possible to take
such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example, and, without
exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and
arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to
the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential
doctrines .... " 19

16. RICHARD RUSH, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1815), reprinted in READINGS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 268, 271 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1949).
17. Nature and Method of Legal Studies, 3 u .s. MONTHLY L. MAG. 381-82 ( 1851)
18. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, MAGNITUDE AND IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1859),
reprinted in STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAw AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 740, 740-745 (5th ed. 2000).
19. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Preface to Selection of Cases on the Law of
Contracts, reprinted in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 18, at 747. A similar
characterization of law as a science was written by the Dean of Columbia Law School; see

Published by SURFACE, 2005

7

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2005], Art. 11

138

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 33: 131

Law, according to this account, was a science with inductive,
analytical and deductive aspects. Decided cases were the raw material
of law (its empirical component). Decisions fell into patterns, from
which the governing rules, concepts and principles could be derived
through induction. These rules, concepts and principles could be
logically organized and their necessary content and implications made
evident, then applied deductively to determine the outcomes in future
cases. Lawyers, judges, and law professors engaged in this process in
an ongoing basis. The common law and rights together formed a
coherent and gapless whole which objectively determined the decision
in any given case. These ideas formed the basis of a school of thought
known as formalists, to be discussed later. 20
Non-instrumental views of law as a science survived well the
twentieth century. Yale law professor Walter Wheeler Cook observed
in the American Bar Association Journal in 1927:
Prominent teachers of law still tell us that we must preserve what they
call the logical symmetry of the law, that after all the law is logical;
and talk about deducting the rule to be applied to a new situation by
logic from some 'fundamental principle." Back of all this, it is
submitted, is nothing but the old logic; the assumption that in some
way or other we can discover general 'laws,' 'general principles,'
Aristotelian 'universals,' which by means of logical, that is, syllogistic
reasoning, we can deal with new cases as they arise as merely new
samples of preexisting classes. The nineteenth century notion of
science as the ascertainment of all-embracing laws of nature, holding
for all occasions [is still prevalent].
It would be safe to assert that essentially the same ideas underlie
nearly all the teaching in our law schools. 21

II.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NON-INSTRUMENTAL VIEWS

OF THE

COMMON LAW AND THE SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF LAW IDEAL

As indicated at the outset of this article, a core meaning of the rule
of law ideal is that substantive legal limits are placed on the
government. 22 The rule of law in this sense entails the existence of legal
William A. Keener, Methods ofLegal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 143 (1892).
20. A superb study of Langdell's ideas is Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
21. Walter Wheeler Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 306
(1927).
22. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1.
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limits on the sovereign. J.G.A. Pocock explained how this shaped early
seventeenth century views of the common law:
But the attraction which the concept of the ancient constitution
possessed for lawyers and parliamentarians probably resided less in
whatever ultimate principle provided its base, than in its value as a
purely negative argument. For a truly immemorial constitution could
not be subject to a sovereign: since a king could not be known to have
founded it originally, the king now reigning could not claim to revoke
rights rooted in some ancestor's will. In an age when people's minds
were becoming deeply, if dimly, imbued with the fear of some sort of
sovereignty or absolutism, it must have satisfied many men's minds to
be able to argue that the laws of the land were so ancient as to be the
product of no one's will, and to appeal to the almost universally
respected doctrine that law should be above will .... [W]e see how the
concept of antiquity satisfied the need ... for a rule of law which, like
Magna Carta, would have no sovereign.23

Medieval versions of non-instrumental law, continued by early
understandings of the English common law, set, or attempted to set,
legal constraints on the power of kings and parliaments to declare
whatever they willed as the law. Although in the United States the
surrounding trappings (the Constitution) and the mechanism Gudicial
review) by which it operated were different, non-instrumental views of
the common law throughout the nineteenth century similarly were
utilized to set constraints on the power to make law. It was no accident
that non-instrumental accounts of the common law typically evinced
hostility toward legislation. Even when legislation was not subjected to
judicial review by judges, it was strictly construed or given niggardly
interpretations by judges to insure that it conformed to the common law
and constitutional principles. It was in this sense that society was
thought to truly be governed by the rule of law and not the unfettered
will of law makers.
Ill.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT'S IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-INSTRUMENTAL

LAW

The eighteenth century Enlightenment was characterized by the
rise in the prestige of science and reason as the most reliable sources of
truth and knowledge. After the miraculous discoveries of Newton, who

23. POCOCK, supra note 13, at 51-52.
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announced a handful of natural laws that governed everything in the
heavens and on earth, it was thought that all of the secrets of the natural
order would be revealed by science. It was also thought by the
Enlightenment Philosophes that, just as the natural order could be
discovered and beneficially exploited, so too could the social order be
mastered. A science of man and society-focusing on human naturewould yield knowledge about the natural principles of law and morality,
enabling mankind to use reason to shape society to achieve material and
political progress. Science and reason were applied to critically
examine myths, superstitions, religious dogma, longstanding traditions
and customs.
The critical thrust of Enlightenment views effectively undermined
the two aforementioned Medieval pillars of non-instrumental views of
law-natural and divine law, and longstanding custom.
Many
Enlightenment thinkers were hostile to Catholicism, specifically, and
institutionalized religion generally. Divine revelation and Catholic
natural law thus became less acceptable as sources of law. Similarly,
the Enlightenment emphasis on critical scrutiny of received tradition
undermined the prestige that had always attached to custom. What was
once seen as the wisdom of the ages came to be seen as blind fetters of
the dead past holding back progress. A new emphasis on historical
studies, another product of the Enlightenment, produced demonstrations
that historical times and longstanding custom and usage were, often as
not, tyrannical and barbarous, not worthy of emulation or continuing
deference. 24
Many contemporaries of the period, including Blackstone,
simultaneously held onto pre-Enlightenment views and Enlightenment
views, notwithstanding their conflict. Historian Bernard Bailyn found
this in the ideas that surrounded the American Revolution:
The common lawyers the colonists cited, for example, sought to
establish right by appeal to precedent and to an unbroken tradition
evolving from time immemorial, and they assumed, if they did not
argue, that the accumulation of the ages, the burden of inherited
custom, contained within it a greater wisdom than any man or group
of men could devise by the power of reason. Nothing could have been
more alien to the Enlightenment rationalists whom the colonists also
quoted-and with equal enthusiasm. These theorists felt that it was

24. See, for example, JOHN MILTON GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE
PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (Amo Press 1972) (1819).
Originally published in 1819, this book has a remarkably modem critical sensibility.
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precisely the heavy crust of custom that was weighing down the spirit
of man; they sought to throw it off and to create by unfettered power
of reason a framework of institutions superior to the accidental
inheritance of the past. 25

Ultimately, however, the implications of Enlightenment arguments
proved fatal to the foundations of law and morality. The Philosophes
were not moral relativists or anarchists. To the contrary, their goals
were to establish sounder, more rational, and scientific footings for law
and morality, to bring about a more just society. At the outset they had
no doubts that they would be successful in the search for rational moral
and legal principles.
Today we know that they failed. The reasons for this are many,
only two of which will be recited here. First, exploration of the world
made it increasingly evident that there were a multitude of diverse
moral systems with apparently little in common, suggesting that
morality and law were largely conventional. Human nature was base
and could at most be used to come up with a minimum set of rules
necessary to survive in society. Second, the power and scope of reason
became restricted. Reason was once thought capable of producing
substantive principles of the right and good. But in the course of the
Enlightenment reason came to be seen as instrumental. Reason enabled
people to efficiently achieve their ends, but it could not identify the
proper ends to be desired. Notions about the good and right appeared at
bottom to be a product of surrounding cultural views and individual
tastes or passions.
An enduring, bedeviling legacy of the Enlightenment is that it
undercut former beliefs in divine and natural law, and faith in the
wisdom of custom and tradition, once thought to provide correct
principles for morality, law, and life, but it offered no persuasive
replacements. Thus, it spelled the demise of non-instrumental views of
law, for it undermined the very idea that law had or could have any kind
of immanent substantive content or integrity. Law thereafter could only
be a matter of expediency rather than inherent necessity.
IV.

THE SPREAD OF INSTRUMENTAL VIEWS OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES

Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound provided the most

25. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
ENLARGED EDITION 33-34 (enlarged ed., 1992).
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systematic early arguments in support of an instrumental understanding
of law. Holmes called Langdell the "greatest living legal theologian."26
Holmes objected to Langdell' s portrayal of law as a logically
constructed self-contained system of rules and principles that could be
deductively applied to produce answers in specific cases. He asserted
that "you can give any conclusion a logical form. " 27 He was not against
legal principles and logical consistency as such, only against portraying
this systematic coherence as the ultimate end of law, and he was
skeptical of the claim that judges reasoned objectively in this manner.
Holmes dismissed another often cited pillar of the common law: "The
time has gone by when law is only an unconscious embodiment of the
common will." 28
Holmes urged in instrumental terms that "a body of law is more
rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred
articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the
grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in
words."29 "The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of
logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is
an illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." 3 Competing social
interests must be weighed and choices based upon social policy must be
made. Holmes urged that judges engage in this process openly rather
than subconsciously or covertly. "[T]he result of the often proclaimed
judicial aversion to deal with such [policy] considerations is simply to
leave the very ground and foundation of the judgments inarticulate.

°

,,31

Pound likewise attacked the characterization of law as an abstract,
logical science. "Law is not scientific for the sake of science. " 32 He
accused adherents of this approach, what he called a "jurisprudence of
conceptions,"33 for emphasizing logical deduction from assumed
dogmas of law with little attention to social consequences:

26. Oliver W. Holmes, Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing the
second edition of Langdell's contract law casebook).
27. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
28. Quoted in WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
180 (1998).
29. Holmes, supra note 27, at 469.
30. Id. at 465-66.
31. Id. at 467.
32. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908).
33. Id. at 611.
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... the jurisprudence of conceptions tends to decay. Conceptions are
fixed. The premises are no longer to be examined. Everything is
reduced to simple deduction from them. Principles cease to have
importance. The law becomes a body of rules. This is the condition
against which sociologists now protest, and protest rightly. 34

That our case law at its maturity has acquired the sterility of a fully
developed system, may be shown by abundant examples of its failure
to respond to vital needs of present-day life. 35

To serve as the epitome of flawed formalist reasoning, Pound
offered Lochner v. New York, an infamous case in the annals of
American jurisprudence. 36 To protect workers' health and safety, the
New York legislature imposed limits on the working hours of bakers to
no more than ten hours a day and sixty hours a week. The Court
invalidated the statute as an: "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family." 37
Basing the decision on the abstract liberty of contract, the Court ignored
the reality that the bakers had no freedom to bargain-they took the
conditions of emEloyment imposed upon them by the employers, or
didn't get the job. 8 Justice Holmes issued a still echoing dissent, which
lacerated the majority for reading their own personal laissez faire views
into the Constitution. 39
In the same vein as Holmes, Pound wrote that "as a means to an
end, [law] must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties
of its internal structure. . . .,'4o "We do not base institutions upon
deduction from assumed principles of human nature; we require them to
exhibit practical utility, and we rest them 1;/?on a foundation of policy
and established adaptation to human needs.' 1
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and Felix Cohen, and other Legal
34. Id. at 612.
35. Id. at 614.
36. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908).
37. Id. at 56.
38. Id. at 57.
39. Id. at 75.
40. Pound, supra note 32, at 605; see also Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological
Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 ( 1907).
41. Pound, supra note 32, at 609.
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Realists, assumed a more radical stance than Pound, but on the need for
an instrumental view of law they were in complete agreement. In
Llewellyn's characterization, the Legal Realists "view rules, they view
law, as means to end."42 This was the "major tenet" of Legal Realism. 43
Prevailing formalist views of the law involved two distinct notions:
conceptual formalism and rule formalism. Conceptual formalism was
the idea that legal concepts and principles, like liberty of contract,
consisted of necessary content and logical interrelations, all of which
could be discerned through reason. Conceptual formalism was a version
of non-instrumental views of law described earlier. Rule formalism was
the idea that the complete body of rules, principles and concepts was
coherent, internally consistent, comprehensive, and gapless, and that
judges could reason "mechanistically" from this body of common law
to discover the right answer in any particular case.
The Realists attacked both notions. Felix Cohen called conceptual
formalism "transcendental nonsense"-the "theological jurisprudence
of concepts."44 The Realists argued that the content of concepts was not
somehow indelibly predetermined but was a matter to be filled in.
There were conflicts and gaps among the rules, there were exceptions to
every rule, and principles could lead to more than one outcome in a
given context of application. 45 Moreover, a great deal of flexibility was
present when determining what particular binding rule of law issued
from a given case. Rather than starting from the rules and principles
and reasoning toward the decision, the Realists suggested that the
judges began instead with a rough sense of the decision and worked
backward to find supportive legal rules and principles,46 revising the
decision if necessary in the course of coming to an acceptable
conclusion.47

42. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223 (1931).
43. Myres S. McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50
YALE L.J. 827, 834-35 (1941).
44. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935).
45. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv.
431, 443 (1930).
46. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 125-26 (Anchor Books 1963)
( 1930) (quoting cognitive psychologist Jean Piaget).
47. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17, 23 (1924);
Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELLL. Q. 274, 285 (1929).
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INSTRUMENTAL VIEW OF LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND LEGAL
PRACTICE

Over time the instrumental view of law came to dominate. Legal
historian Calvin Woodward wrote in 1968 that "At least in the better
law schools . . . 'realists' are no longer lonely aliens in a hostile world.
In truth ·they probably outweigh in influence, if not in numbers, the
Langdellians. " 48
... the society-wide trend toward secularization is the culmination of
a centuries-long development that has transformed the Law from a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" into a down-to-earth instrument
of social reform and, at the same time of social reform and, at the
same time, translated ... the lawyer from a quasi-priestly figure into a
social engineer.
Legal education . . . has both reflected and
contributed to this long-term trend. 49

The Dean of Cornell Law School, Roger C. Cramton, wrote in
1978 that legal instrumentalism had become "the ordinary religion of
the law school classroom." This "orthodox" wisdom among law
professors, conveyed daily to their students, was "an instrumental
approach to law and lawyering," along with "a ske~tical attitude toward
generalizations, principles, and received wisdom. " 5
Today law tends to be viewed in solely instrumental terms and as
lacking values of its own, other than a limited agreement on certain
'process values' thought to be implicit in our democratic way of doing
things. We agree on methods of resolving our disagreements in the
public arena, but on little else. Substantive goals come from the
political process or from private interests in the community. The
lawyer's task, in an instrumental approach to law, is to facilitate and
manipulate legal processes to advance the interest of his client. 51

Cramton thus captured the view of law as an empty vessel,
matched by a vision of the lawyer whose role was to serve as an
instrument of the client and who treated legal rules and processes in the
48. Calvin Woodward, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA.
L. REV. 689, 732 (1968).
49. Id. at 733.
50. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 248, 250 (1978).
51. Id. at 257.
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same manipulative way.
Inevitably, teaching students to view law instrumentally must have
an impact on the practice of law. Lawyers can satisfy their duty to
clients while remaining within the spirit of the law, seeing the law as
binding dictates to be complied with. Another approach, however, is
one in which lawyers manipulate and stretch law and legal processes to
their very outer limits, no matter how far away from or contrary to its
underlying spirit. Both are recognized approaches toward lawyering. 52
They might sound similar, but pushed to the extreme they are as far
apart as this: do what the law requires when pursing the client's end,
versus, do whatever it takes when pursuing the client's end (including
manipulating or avoiding the law). Many lawyers in practice today take
an attitude closer to the second than the first.
The second attitude toward law is ingrained in students in law
school. Below is a fair characterization of what, since the 1970's,
became a widely practiced method of teaching law:
Most important of all, [lawyers] must have the ability to suspend
judgment, to see both sides of a case that is presented to them, for they
may be called on to argue either side. The task of the law professor is
often to chan,ge a student's mind, and then change it back again, until
the student and the class understand that in many situations that will
come before them professionally they can with a whole heart devote
their skills to either side. Then they have to block out much of that
part of their mind that saw the other side, finding ways to diminish
and combat what th? once considered the strong points of the
opponent's argument. 5

Regularly, professors will ask the same student or different
students to articulate the best arguments on both sides. Through this
pedagogical technique, students are taught to ignore the binding quality
of law. After three years of this, students understandably come to think
that legal rules are nothing but tools lawyers utilize on behalf of
whichever side they represent.
Consistent with the purely instrumental attitude toward legal rules

52. For explorations of the different models of lawyering, see generally Rob Atkinson,
A dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REv. 259 (1995);
Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence
and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995).
53. SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER , THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING
ATTHE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 116 (1994).
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and processes, lawyers "are expected and even encouraged to exploit
every loophole in the rules, take advantage of every one of their
opponents' tactical mistakes or oversights, and stretch every legal or
factual interpretation to favor their clients." 54 Robert Gordon described
this common orientation:
Lawyers should not commit crimes or help clients to plan crimes.
They should obey only such ethical instructions as are clearly
expressed in rules and ignore vague standards. Finally, they should
not tell outright lies to judges or fabricate evidence. Otherwise they
may, and if it will serve their clients' interest must, exploit any gap,
ambiguity, technicality, or loophole, any not-obviously-and-totallyimplausible interpretation of the law or facts. 55

It should be emphasized that the claim here is not that all lawyers
take such an unrestrained instrumental attitude toward legal rules all the
time, but many lawyers do much of the time.
This characterization is not limited to private lawyers. The U.S.
Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel's infamous "torture
memo"-which presented a legal analysis of the limits on interrogation
of prisoners imposed by legal prohibitions against torture· is a supreme
example of lawyers exploiting "any gap, ambiguity, technicality, or
loophole, any non-obviously-and-totally-implausible interpretation of
the law or facts" in order to allow the greatest possible leeway for the
U.S. interrogation of prisoners. It was an everyday lawyerly exercise in
selective reading of the applicable body of legal rules that led to the
desired result of identifying an extraordinarily high threshold for
torture: "the level that would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently
serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or
serious impairment of body functions-in order to constitute torture. " 56
A great deal of pain and suffering can be inflicted before engaging in
torture, by that legal interpretation, which is precisely what the Bush
Administration wanted.
The lawyers got there in a transparently simple move. The U.S.
statute that prohibited torture described it as "severe" pain and

54. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988).
55. Id. at 20.
56. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, White House Counsel to the President 6 (Aug. 1, 2002),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/doj interrogationmemo20020801.
pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
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suffering, without defining what was "severe." Office of Legal Counsel
lawyers searched for the most stringent definition of "severe pain" they
could find, which happened to come in an insurance-related statute that
mentioned organ failure and death when identifying emergency medical
conditions. 57 Hence they defined torture as involving injury that rose to
the level of organ failure and death. The overarching orientation of these
lawyers was not to figure out what the law was trying to prohibit"torture"-but rather was to produce an arguable interpretation of the
law that would allow them to accomplish what they desired-to allow
the application of as much pain possible in order to make prisoners talk,
and to provide legal cover if the torture was discovered.
When this memo came to light, on the heels of disclosure of torture
at Abu Ghraib prison, the public outcry was intense. For the purposes
of this article, what is most revealing was the relatively unruffled
response of lawyers, summarized by a legal scholar who noted the
contrast with the public shock:
Much of the legal profession . . . met the news with a dramatically
different take. Charles Fried, for example, defended the OLC's work,
asserting that ' [t]here's nothing wrong with exploring any topic to find
out what the legal requirements are.'. . . Eric Posner and Adrien
Vermeule characterized the analysis as 'standard lawyerly fare,
routine stuff.' Those lawyers who did criticize the memoranda
concerned themselves with the deficiencies of the legal analysis .... 58

Although the subject of torture was anything but routine, the memo was
indeed routine stuff in the sense that every lawyer who reads it would
find the style of argument of instrumentally manipulating the law to
reach the end desired intimately familiar. It is what lawyers do.
Legal rules at their core have a binding quality. It is unclear what
the full consequences will be to a legal system which is populated by
lawyers who ignore the binding quality of rules to, without restraint
short of committing a crime, instrumentally manipulate legal rules and
processes on behalf of their clients. There are indications that the U.S.
legal profession is headed in this direction.

57. See Robert Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS,
(forthcoming 2006).
58. Id. (manuscript at 3).
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INSTRUMENTALISM AND JUDGING

When legal education teaches students to see and utilize law
instrumentally, and the practice of law reinforces this attitude and
approach, it would seem inevitable that a person who has operated in
this environment for a decade or more before ascending to the position
of judge will be affected in ways that lead to seeing law in more
instrumental terms. In the 1970's legal theorists began to observe that
judges increasingly engaged in instrumental reasoning to satisfy the
purposes behind the law, or to further social policies or purposes, or to
achieve social or individual justice.59 In Law and Society in Transition
(1978), Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick argued that contemporary
law was in the process of evolving to a higher legal stage of "responsive
law" in which "there is a renewal of instrumentalism . . . for more
objective public ends."60 This was an advance, they claimed, over the
previous formalistic stage of "autonomous law" in which law was seen
as separate from politics, and decisions were made strictly according to
legal rules with no attention to consequences. In this new higher stage
"the logic of legal judgment becomes closely congruent with the logic
of moral and practical judgment. " 61
With this spread of instrumental reasoning in judicial decisions, in
everyday cases as well as in constitutional cases, judges were
increasingly required to straddle two contrary thrusts: judges are asked
to apply rules and to reason instrumentally to achieve policies and
purposes, and just outcomes. Roberto Unger articulated the stark
difference between these approaches:
One way is to establish rules to govern general categories of acts and
persons, and then to decide particular disputes among persons on the
basis of the established rules. This is legal justice. The other way is
to determine goals and then, quite independently of rules, to decide
particular cases by a judgment of what decision is most likely to
contribute to the predetermined goals, a judgment of instrumental
rationality. This is substantive justice.62

59. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); P.S.
ATIYAH, FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRAGMATISM: CHANGES IN THE FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS AND THE LAW ( 1978).
60. PHILLIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW 15 (1978).
61. Id. at 89.
62. UNGER, supra note 59, at 89.
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Modern judges, Nonet, Selznick, and Unger suggested, were asked to
engage in both modes of analysis, which they oscillated between. 63
Note that a built in tension exists between strict rule application
and instrumental reasoning toward ends. Judges are charged with the
task of applying legal rules, which involves coming to whatever
conclusion is indicated by the body of rules. Achieving ends (satisfying
policies, purposes, or individual or social justice), in contrast, is focused
on coming to a particular outcome, regardless of what the rules require.
What is a judge to do when the applicable legal rules point toward a
different end, to an end contrary to the correct policy or purpose or to
individual or social justice? A system committed to the rule of law
would nonetheless insist that the judge come to the outcome required by
the law. This respects the binding quality of rules. A system committed
to an instrumental view of law, however, would have the judge ignore
or manipulate the legal rules and come to the designated outcome,
notwithstanding the dictates of the legal rules. Judges who do this will
thus disregard the binding quality of legal rules. Moreover, matters are
even more complicated and variable owing to the fact that every
situation is unique. When the same policies, purposes, or sense of
justice are asked to be satisfied under contrasting circumstances, the
result will be a great variation in the application (or non-application)
and interpretation of the same body of rules. That is what follows when
achieving designated ends matter more than consistently applying legal
rules. For the above reasons, the predictability, certainty, and equality
of application of law will suffer. The rule of law will suffer.
This aforementioned infusion of instrumental reasoning relates to
the achievement of agreed upon social policies, purposes, or notions of
justice.
A different though connected (and sometimes
indistinguishable) way in which instrumentalism detracts from the rule
of law in the context of judicial reasoning relates instead to instrumental
reasoning in connection with the personal values and goals of judges.
Owing to the influence of the Realists, the belief that judges' decisions
are based upon ideologically preferred outcomes has grown in strength.
Behaviorist political scientists have long claimed that judges are
"politicians in black robes." By the Realist account, this operates as a
subconscious process on the part of judges, who inevitably perceive the
law through an ideologically colored lens. But it can also be conscious:
when necessary, in the same way that a lawyer manipulates legal rules
instrumentally to serve the interests of clients, legal rules can be twisted
63. NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 60, at 15; see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW
IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 195 (1976).
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by judges to arrive at outcomes they desire. "The 'law' . .. becomes
mere instruments or barriers that judges must utilize strategically to
advance their a priori political objectives."64
Viewing the law through the prism of one's personal beliefs is
perhaps unavoidable, though to correct for this judges can attempt to
scrutinize the influence their prejudices and views have on their
decisions. What is not inevitable is that a judge would cross over from
abiding by the binding quality of law, sincerely trying to figure out what
the law requires (however unclear), to instrumentally manipulating the
legal rules to reach a personally desired end, much as a lawyer does in
service of a client. This traverses the fundamental divide between
judges coming to the outcome determined by the law, versus judges
coming to the outcome they personally prefer. The key factor in
separating the two is the attitude and commitment of judges to live up to
their obligation to follow the law.
The critical question is whether the pervasive spread of
consummately instrumental views of law within the legal culture will
have the effect of encouraging more judges more often to cross over
from the first orientation to the second. Then more of their decisions
will be based upon what they personally prefer, rather than upon what
law requires. This would no longer be a system in which the legal rules
have a binding effect on judges. It would no longer be a system of the
rule of law, but instead the rule of the individuals who happen to be the
judges.
VII.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Two separate arguments have been pressed about how an
instrumental view of law detracts from the rule of law. The first
argument, at the systemic level, was that seeing law as an instrument, an
empty vessel to be filled in and applied to satisfy whatever end is
desired, is inconsistent with the classical understanding of the rule of
law that there are limits on the government: that even when exercising
its power to make law, there were certain things the government could
not do. The second argument was that lawyers manipulate legal rules
and process to instrumentally achieve the ends of their clients, and,
more to the point, that judges have begun to reason more instrumentally
in their legal decisions to arrive at particular outcomes. Instrumental
treatment of rules in these respects are detrimental to the binding quality
64. Cornell W. Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or,
Why Be So Positive About the Judicialization of Politics?), 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69,
83 (2002).
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of law and contrary to the formal rule of law.
Constitutional analysis involves an intersection of these two
arguments.
Constitutional provisions-for example, clauses
enumerating governmental powers, or the bill of rights-specify what
the government has the power to do and specify what it cannot do. In
this sense, the U.S. Constitution represents the modem functional
equivalent of former non-instrumental views of law. Both control and
set limits on ordinary legislation (although the difference remains that
the Constitution is an enactment of positive law that can be changed,
whereas non-instrumental law was, in theory at least, beyond the will of
the lawmakers).
Thus the U.S. Constitution is a higher form of law that it imposes
content-based limitations on the government equivalent to the
substantive rule of law. Instrumental thinking about law has penetrated
so deeply and thoroughly, however, that it has come to dominate the
analysis of substantive constitutional limits, as constitutional scholar
Steven D. Smith observed:
In its most visible aspect, constitutional law presents reason in
instrumentalist or "means-end" terms. Scholars have pointed out that
most of the doctrinal formulas articulated by the Court, whether under
the First Amendment or the Fourteenth or the commerce clause, are
presented in essentially the same monotonously instrumentalist terms.
So laws are viewed as means to social ends, and a law's
constitutionality is said to depend on how important the law's ends are
and how effective and necessary the law is as a means to achieving
those ends. 65

Even in the context of constitutional limits, therefore, law has been
largely emptied of any substantive values of its own. 66
Yet another infusion of instrumental reasoning follows from an
increasingly common form of constitutional analysis applied by the
Supreme Court. In a number of important subject matters, the Supreme
Court renders decisions using a "balancing approach" that weighs the
various interests at stake. Balancing is nothing like rule application that

65. Steven D. Smith, The Academy, the Court, and the Culture of Rationalism, in THAT
EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 105 (Christopher Wolfe,
ed. 2004) (citing Robert F. Nagel, Rationalism in Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. COMMENT.
9, 9-12 (1987) (citation omitted).
66. See ALBERT w. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000).
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has traditionally been the task of judges. Balancing involves case-bycase decisions that invite, or create a great deal of leeway for,
instrumental reasoning to support the outcomes personally supported by
the Justices. 67
As this suggests, all of the implications of the second argument,
about the increased instrumental reasoning of judges, apply full force to
constitutional analysis. The instrumentalism that has come to be a
routine part of judicial decision making similarly infects interpretations
of the Constitution. Thus the problems that plague the formal rule of
law also plague judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions.
VIII. POLITICIZATION OF THE LAW
A powerful logic and momentum are at work here, which can be
seen when the above trends are taken to an extreme and linked together.
Owing to the indeterminacy of language and general rules, and to the
fact that every situation that arises is unique, legal rules and
constitutional provisions and principles are inevitably susceptible to
different interpretations. This is especially so in a deeply divided
society where people see rules, principles and standards in different
ways. Judges reason more instrumentally in cases because they are
called upon to do so by a greater tendency toward achieving ends
(policies, purposes, individual and substantive justice), and, separately,
because more judges more of the time appear to be willing to disregard
the binding quality of law to instrumentally manipulate the applicable
rules to lead to the outcomes they personally desire. The effect of these
developments is that legal decisions will be increasingly infused with
political disputes, will increasingly be based upon political judgments,
and will increasingly be determined according to the political
predispositions of the judges. As a consequence of judges making what
appear to be political rather than legal decisions, political fights will
increasingly break out over who will become judges. Thereafter the
judiciary will become politicized and sharply divided along political
lines.
If all of this were to come to pass, the breakdown of the rule of law
would not be far behind. Fortunately, the U.S. legal system has not
traveled as far as this scenario, although the Supreme Court is not far
from it.
Political fights over judicial appointments are now
commonplace at both state and federal levels, but it cannot yet be said
67. See Christopher Wolfe, The Rehnquist Court and 'Conservative Judicial Activism,'
in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 200-01
(Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004).
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that the judiciary as a whole is sharply divided along political lines and
it cannot be said that decisions are more political than legal. Current
events and attitudes reflect enough of this scenario, however, to suggest
that it must be taken seriously.
CONCLUSION

An instrumental understanding of law does not inevitably
undermine the rule of law. The most important ingredient for the rule
of law to function is that lawyers and judges, in particular, must be
imbued with the belief that at their core legal rules have a binding
component. If the entire legal culture develops the sense that legal rules
and processes are merely instruments to be manipulated to further
whatever ends are desired, the rule of law will be hard pressed to
survive.
The broader message of this article is that the continued existence
of the rule of law is always a contingent matter: societies and cultures
are constantly changing in unplanned and uncontrolled ways, often with
unforeseen implications and consequences. The fact that we enjoy the
benefits of a rule of law system today provides no assurance that it will
be here tomorrow.
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